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Posner, Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech
Ashutosh Bhagwat*
Judge Richard Posner recently asserted that the original
understanding of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was to
prohibit “censorship”—meaning prior restraints—but not subsequent
punishments. Posner was following in the footsteps of many other
eminent jurists including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Joseph Story,
James Wilson, and ultimately William Blackstone.
The problem is, this claim is simply wrong. Firstly, it misquotes
Blackstone. Blackstone said that the liberty of the press meant only
freedom from prior restraints; he never discussed speech. When one does
examine the Speech Clause, it becomes quite clear that its protections
cannot be limited to freedom from prior restraints. Most importantly,
this is because during the Framing era, when speech meant in-person,
oral communication, no system of prior restraints on speech was
remotely possible or ever envisioned. So, if the Speech Clause only bans
prior restraints, it bans nothing. A broader reading of the Speech
Clause is also supported by its (admittedly sketchy) history, and by an
examination of the political theory underlying the American
Revolution. Indeed, not only is the Speech Clause not limited to
banning prior restraints, but a close examination of the historical
evidence strongly suggests—though this issue cannot be definitively
resolved—that a substantial portion of the Framing generation
probably read the Press Clause more broadly as well.
What lessons can be learned from this? The first is a need for great
caution in “translating” Framing era understandings into our
modern—and very different—technological and cultural context.
Second, when seeking “original understandings” of the Constitution, it
is important to be aware that consensus sometimes simply did not exist.
Indeed, the Framers may have given no consideration at all to specific
issues, thus indicating limits on the usefulness of the entire
originalist enterprise.

* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law. B.A. 1986 Yale University.
J.D. 1990 The University of Chicago. Contact: aabhagwat@ucdavis.edu. Thanks to Dick
Posner for an extremely illuminating conversation. Full disclosure: I clerked for Judge Posner
from 1991 to 1992.
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INTRODUCTION
In May of 2012, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v.
Alvarez, holding that an Illinois statute prohibiting the taping of
conversations without the consent of all parties to the conversation,
as applied to a program intending to openly record police officers
performing their duties in public, violated the First Amendment. 1
Judge Richard Posner dissented. Most of his opinion concerned the
impact of the proposed recordings on privacy and on police
effectiveness. However, in an introductory passage Judge Posner had
this to say about the broader history of the First Amendment:
Judges asked to affirm novel “interpretations” of the First
Amendment should be mindful that the constitutional right of free
speech, as construed nowadays, is nowhere to be found in the
Constitution. The relevant provision of the First Amendment
merely forbids Congress to abridge free speech, which as
understood in the eighteenth century meant freedom only from
censorship (that is, suppressing speech, rather than just punishing
the speaker after the fact). A speaker could be prosecuted for
seditious libel, for blasphemy, and for much other reprobated
speech besides, but in a prosecution he would at least have the
protection of trial by jury, which he would not have if hauled
before a censorship board; and his speech or writing would not
have been suppressed, which is what censorship boards do.
Protection against censorship was the only protection that the
amendment was understood to create. 2

In support of his argument, Judge Posner cited Justice Holmes’s
famous (or infamous) opinion in Patterson v. Colorado 3 and
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 4 along with Seventh Circuit precedent 5
and Akhil Amar’s groundbreaking work on the Bill of Rights. 6 He
then emphasized that limiting the First Amendment to condemning
1.
2.
3.
4.

679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461–62 (1907)).
Id. (comparing with 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 150–53 (1769)).
5. Id. (citing Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th
Cir. 2001)).
6. Id. (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 23–24 (1998)).
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censorship—meaning a system of prior restraints through licensing—
“is the original understanding,” arguing that this fact should make
judges hesitant to adopt aggressive expansions of the right of
free speech. 7
Judge Posner’s understanding of the First Amendment’s history
as reaching only prior restraints on speech has a long pedigree and
strong support. In addition to Holmes and Blackstone, he could
easily have cited Joseph Story, 8 leading Framer and later Supreme
Court Justice James Wilson, 9 and two early cases from Pennsylvania 10
and Massachusetts. 11 The problem is that this understanding is
wrong. And not only is it wrong, aspects of it are clearly and
obviously wrong. How could the preeminent appellate judge of his
generation (to say nothing of his illustrious sources) possibly make
such a mistake?
In this brief essay, I seek to shed some light on this conundrum,
and on the relationship between prior restraints and First
Amendment history more generally. What emerges from this
investigation is a complex set of fundamental issues, including
evolving linguistic meanings and understandings due to changing
culture and technology, the oversimplification by many of a very
complex history, and most fundamentally, an overly aggressive push
7. Id. at 610–11 (emphasis in original).
8. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1880, at 610 (4th ed. 1873) (“It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment
imports no more than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions
upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always that he does not injure any
other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation; and so always that he does not
thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government.”).
9. See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 204–05 (1985) (describing
James Wilson adopting this position at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 99 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS] (reprinting the text of a
speech Wilson gave at the convention in which he articulated the position); Philip B. Kurland,
The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55
MISS. L.J. 225, 235–36 (1985).
10. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319 (1788).
11. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313–14 (Mass. 1825) (“[I]t is well
understood, and received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of the press, that it
was intended to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised
[sic] by other governments, and in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards
enlightening their fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers. The liberty of the
press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like
the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance
or destruction.”).
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by lawyers to find consensus among the Framing generation in the
face of overwhelming evidence of ambiguity and disagreement.
I. MISQUOTING BLACKSTONE 12
Our story begins with a misquotation of sorts. As noted above,
in his dissent in ACLU v. Alvarez Judge Posner stated that the
original understanding of the First Amendment was that it protected
speech only against “censorship,” meaning prior restraints. 13 In
support of his argument, he cited numerous sources, including
Justice Holmes’s Patterson opinion and Blackstone’s Commentaries. 14
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England are the
primary source of the theory that the First Amendment forbids only
prior restraints, largely because of the strong influence Blackstone
had on the Framing generation’s understanding of traditional
English common law rights. Given the importance of Blackstone, it
is worthwhile to examine the precise, oft-quoted language
Blackstone uses: “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published.” 15
This language is repeated almost verbatim in the 1825 Blanding
decision from Massachusetts, though oddly without citing
Blackstone, 16 and by Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, this time with proper attribution. 17
Blanding in turn was the primary source of Justice Holmes’s
comment in Patterson that “the main purpose of [freedom of speech
and freedom of the press] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints

12. Cf. BART D. EHRMAN, MISQUOTING JESUS: THE STORY BEHIND WHO CHANGED
(2007).
13. 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
14. See supra notes 3−4 and accompanying text.
15. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 151. It should be noted in passing that the actual
words Blackstone and most early commentators used were “previous restraints,” not “prior
restraints.” The phrase “prior restraints” was first used by the Supreme Court in 1931 in Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 733 (1931). It quickly, however, became standard
usage. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 648 (1955); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
16. Blanding, 3 Pick. at 313–14.
17. STORY, supra note 8, § 1884, at 612–13 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 4,
at 151).

THE BIBLE AND WHY

1154

BHAGWAT.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1151

3/21/2016 4:26 PM

Posner, Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech

upon publications as had been practiced by other governments.’” 18
Completing the circle, in Alvarez Judge Posner cites Patterson 19 and
Blackstone, 20 as well as the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blue Canary
Corp. v. City of Milwaukee 21 (an opinion which he also authored) and
Akhil Amar’s The Bill of Rights. 22 In Blue Canary, Judge Posner
wrote that “Blackstone defined freedom of speech and the press as
freedom from prior restraints.” 23 Amar’s own sources are Blackstone,
the speech by James Wilson discussed above, 24 and Story. 25
Ultimately, then, it all goes back to Blackstone (assuming that
Wilson’s views were shaped by Blackstone, as seems
exceedingly likely).
The problem is, Blackstone himself does not say what Posner
attributes to him. Blackstone speaks only of the “liberty of the
press”; 26 he says nothing about speech. Similarly, when Wilson spoke
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, he mentioned only freedom
of the press, not speech. 27 There are good historical reasons for this,
as we will discuss shortly, but for now the key point is that in Alvarez
and Blue Canary, Posner is extending the classic Blackstonian
argument beyond its original limits. Indeed, Blackstone has precisely
nothing to say about freedom of speech, as opposed to the press,
because his Commentaries concern the English common law, not the
First Amendment, and the English common law of the eighteenth
century did not recognize any broad right to freedom of speech. 28
(As we shall see, the same is true of most of the American States
prior to 1789.)
To be fair, Judge Posner is in good, indeed the highest,
company. As we have seen, Joseph Story made the same leap. While

18. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Blanding, 3 Pick.
at 313).
19. 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson, 205
U.S. at 461–62).
20. Id. (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 4).
21. Id. (citing Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th
Cir. 2001)).
22. Id. (citing AMAR, supra note 6, at 23–24).
23. Blue Canary, 251 F.3d at 1123.
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25. AMAR, supra note 6, at 23 n.19.
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4.
27. LEVY, supra note 9, at 204.
28. Id. at 3, 5.
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Story limits himself to discussing liberty of the press in his specific
discussion of Blackstone, 29 he had previously stated firmly (though
without support) that “the language of [the First] amendment
imports no more than that every man shall have a right to speak,
write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without
any prior restraint.” 30 Similarly, in Patterson, Justice Holmes refers to
both freedom of speech and the press in reference to prior restraints,
even though his main source, Blanding, refers only to
“publications.” 31 The question is whether the distinction between
speech and the press really makes any difference. As it turns out,
it does.
II. SPEECH VERSUS THE PRESS
The First Amendment provides, inter alia, that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 32
Many commentators have noted, however, that the modern Supreme
Court has failed to meaningfully distinguish between the Speech and
Press Clauses, essentially subsuming the Press Clause into the Speech
Clause. 33 Even in cases where a law directly regulates the press, and
the plaintiff explicitly invokes the Press Clause, the Court’s habit is
to refer generically to “the First Amendment.” 34 This blending of
two distinct provisions has generally been thought not to matter
because the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the view that
the Press Clause gives special rights or protections to the
institutional press or any other distinct group of speakers, and so

29. STORY, supra note 8, § 1884, at 612–13.
30. Id. § 1880, at 610.
31. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313 (Mass. 1825)).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
258 (2004) (citing David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430, 448–
50 (2002); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 22-b21 (3d
ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001)); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1029, 1037 (2015).
34. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 582–83, 591–93 (1983); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679–82 (1972); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821–22 (1974).
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both clauses protect communications, presumably in parallel ways. 35
It turns out, however, that ignoring the Press Clause as a distinct
source of constitutional principles has the consequence of blinding
one to important differences between speech and the press.
To understand the differences clearly, it is important to bear in
mind the nature of communications technologies in 1789–1791,
when the First Amendment was drafted and ratified. At that time,
there were essentially three methods of communication: oral,
unamplified speech; hand-written correspondence; and printed
materials created using a printing press. Once this is recognized, the
distinct functions of the Speech and Press Clauses become clear: the
Speech Clause protects oral communications, and the Press Clause
protects the printing press and its products. 36 And indeed, the most
careful modern scholarship tends to confirm the view that the Press
Clause was intended and has been understood to protect a particular
technology: the printing press (as opposed to a favored group of
speakers, the institutional press). 37 Moreover, this reading fits well
with Blackstone and the history of prior restraints. After all, the
historical licensing regime in England and its demise in the late
seventeenth century, 38 which engendered Blackstone’s definition of
press freedom as a lack of previous restraints, extended to all uses of
the printing press, not just the printing of newspapers. 39 The Press
Clause limits governmental regulation of the printing press, and one

35. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010); id.
at 390 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703–05; Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937); First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797–801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
36. This of course leaves open the status of hand-written communications. Perhaps the
Framers meant to subsume such communications in the Speech Clause, or perhaps they simply
did not consider the matter; it is hard to tell, especially because, as we shall see, the Framers
paid little or no attention to any aspect of the Speech Clause.
37. Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology?
From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 429–46 (2013);
Anderson, supra note 33, at 446–47.
38. See Emerson, supra note 15, at 651; Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of
The Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the
Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L. REV. 295, 305 (2001); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 245–46 (1936).
39. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 152 n.a.
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key limitation (albeit not necessarily the only one 40) is that it forbids
licensing, or as Judge Posner calls it, “censorship” of the press. 41
If that is what the Press Clause was understood to mean, what
about the Speech Clause? This is a very difficult question to answer
because, as Philip Kurland has noted, the Framers were almost
entirely focused on freedom of the press, largely ignoring freedom of
speech. 42 The behavior of the colonies and early states confirms this
focus. No colonial charter prior to the American Revolution
protected a general right of free speech, though they did protect the
rights of legislators during legislative sessions. 43 Moreover, of the
original thirteen states, only one—Pennsylvania—provided
protection for freedom of speech in its state constitution at the time
of ratification, 44 though many state constitutions did refer to the
freedom of the press. 45 Perhaps most tellingly, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of June, 1776 drafted by George Mason,
considered the Father of the Bill of Rights, protects freedom of the
press, but does not mention free speech. 46 Indeed, as late as Joseph
Story, the preeminence of the press right over the speech right
remained. The section of his Commentaries discussing the Speech
and Press Clauses begins with the phrase “[t]he next clause of the
amendment respects the liberty of the press,” but then quotes both
the Speech and Press Clauses. 47
The pre-Framing neglect of freedom of speech might be taken to
suggest that the Framers simply did not care about free speech, as
opposed to a free press. But that cannot be quite right. After all,
despite his omission in 1776, Mason did include an explicit freedom

40. See infra Part III.
41. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
42. Kurland, supra note 9, at 237; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment
Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J.
1, 15 (2011).
43. David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429,
431 (1983).
44. LEVY, supra note 9, at 5. By the time the First Amendment was ratified on
December 15, 1791, a fourteenth state—Vermont—had been added which did protect
freedom of speech. Id. at 186; Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 15. But the fact remains that
during the Framing period, freedom of speech was almost entirely neglected.
45. LEVY, supra note 9, at 184–85.
46. See The Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 12 (1776), http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.html.
47. STORY, supra note 8, § 1880, at 609.
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of speech provision in his Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, which
became the model for James Madison’s eventual proposal for a bill of
rights to the first Congress. 48 And James Madison also, of course,
included free speech in his proposed constitutional amendments
which eventually resulted in the Bill of Rights. 49 Indeed, during
congressional debates, Madison described freedom of speech and of
the press as among “the most valuable on the whole list.” 50 Finally,
Kurland’s suggestion that free speech was simply seen as an element
of free exercise also cannot be sustained. 51 Free speech and free
exercise are distinct rights granted separate protection in the Bill of
Rights. Moreover, despite their pairing in the final text of the First
Amendment, the drafting history of the First Amendment clearly
reveals that the Framers did not even consider speech and religion to
be particularly related to each other; the combining of speech and
religion in a single amendment occurred very late in the legislative
process and appears to be more a historical coincidence than
anything else. 52
Freedom of speech, then, is a distinct right, which was
consciously added to the Constitution in addition to freedom of the
press (and to free exercise of religion). Moreover, Blackstone and
other contemporaries defined freedom of the press as barring only
prior restraints, not freedom of speech. Perhaps, however, Judge
Posner’s extension of Blackstone to speech can be justified on the
grounds that speech and press rights are parallel rights, which mean
the same thing—freedom from prior restraints, and nothing else. A
brief consideration of technology and practicalities, however,
demonstrates that this is a most unlikely reading.

48. See George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, ¶
16, http://www.constitution.org/gmason/amd_gmas.htm [hereinafter Mason’s Master
Draft]. Interestingly, Mason’s proposal extended not just to speech and the press, but also to
“writing and publishing,” seemingly covering hand-written correspondence as well.
49. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83.
50. David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 832 (1985).
51. See Kurland, supra note 9, at 237.
52. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental
Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 91–92 (2014) (describing drafting history
of the First Amendment, and noting that the Speech and Religion Clauses did not become
combined in a single amendment until September 9, 1789, just weeks before final adoption,
and furthermore that the Clauses were combined with no explanation).
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The most obvious reason why freedom of speech, as understood
in 1791, could not have been limited to a bar on prior restraints is
that an actual system of prior restraints on speech was, and is,
impossible. In no conceivable universe could the government require
permission from censors before citizens could speak, or even speak
on political issues (remember, for the Framers to speak meant to
speak in person, without amplification). The very idea of such a
system is profoundly silly. This point, of course, has been recognized
before. Thomas Cooley, the author of the leading constitutional
treatise of the latter nineteenth century, commented that “the mere
exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by
the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered
orally there can be no previous censorship . . . .” 53 Zechariah Chafee,
the leading American free speech scholar of the first part of the
twentieth century, quoted Cooley’s language, and described his
argument as “unanswerable.” 54 And despite Posner’s citation to him,
Akhil Amar in The Bill of Rights went so far as to describe the idea
that the freedom of speech can be limited to freedom from prior
restraints as “utterly outlandish,” precisely because licensing speech
is impossible. 55
In short, numerous scholars over the past century and a half have
pointed out that whatever the meaning of freedom of the press, the
idea that freedom of speech means only freedom from prior
restraints is quite obviously wrong, even “outlandish.” Nor was this
objection to a narrow reading of the Free Speech Clause unknown to
the Framing generation. The leading Jeffersonian politician (and
later Secretary of the Treasury) Albert Gallatin, in a speech in
opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798, said the following:
But that contended for, to wit, that the only prohibition was that
of passing any law laying previous restraints upon either, was
absurd, so far as it related to speech; for it pre-supposed that
Congress, by the Constitution, as it originally stood, might have
passed laws laying such restraints upon speech; and what these
possibly could have been, he was altogether at a loss to conceive,
unless gentlemen chose to assert that the Constitution had given
Congress a power to seal the mouths or to cut the tongues of the
53.
54.
55.

1160
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citizens of the Union; and these, however, were the only means by
which previous restraints could be laid on the freedom of speech.
Was it not evident, that, as speech could not be restrained, but
might be punished, a Constitutional clause forbidding any
abridgment of the freedom of speech must necessarily mean, not
that no laws should be passed laying previous restraints upon it, but
that no punishment by law be inflicted upon it? 56

Quoting this passage the scholar Leonard Levy, considered to be
the leading modern defender of the view that the First Amendment
was understood to bar only prior restraints, explicitly acknowledged
that because previous restraints on speech were nonexistent and
impossible, freedom of speech was never understood to mean “the
absence of prior restraints.” 57
To be fair, despite Gallatin’s and others’ strong language, it is
not quite true that speech can never be licensed. As Judge Posner
himself pointed out in Blue Canary, there is one historical example
of prior restraints on speech: the licensing of plays in Shakespearean
England. 58 No one, however, could seriously argue that the sole
purpose of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was to
prevent the licensing of plays. Such a reading is absurdly narrow, 59
and ignores the obviously political focus of the Free Speech Clause
(as well as the Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses which
accompany it). 60 In truth, very little theater existed in colonial
America, in no small part because of religious objections to it,
making a theater-focused reading of the First Amendment
particularly implausible.
The implication of the fact that prior restraints on speech are
impossible is clear: a reading of the First Amendment limiting the
Free Speech Clause to bar only prior restraints would make freedom
of speech a nullity, providing no actual protections. To be sure, as
noted earlier, the Framing generation paid little attention to freedom

56. LEVY, supra note 9, at 302–03.
57. Id. at 303–04 & n.80.
58. Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 2001).
59. Under this view, the entire free speech jurisprudence of the Supreme Court would
consist of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (treating as an
invalid prior restraint a system by which a municipality granted permission to use its theater
only after reviewing the content of productions, and denying permission for Hair).
60. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 991–92 (2011).
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of speech, as opposed to the press. 61 Nonetheless, freedom of speech
was considered important enough by Madison and Mason to include
in the Bill of Rights, and during congressional debates Madison
identified the Speech and Press Clauses as “among ‘the most
valuable on the whole list.’” 62 It would be odd, to say the least, if
one of the most valuable rights in the entire Bill of Rights
protected nothing.
In addition to simple logic, what we know of the history of the
Free Speech Clause also tends to confirm that it was understood to
protect against subsequent punishment, not previous restraint. The
roots of protections for free speech are a bit foggy because the
English common law did not provide any general free speech
protection, 63 free speech is not discussed in Blackstone, and speech
was similarly neglected in colonial charters and early state
constitutions with the exception of Pennsylvania. 64 It is not quite
true, however, that early English and American law provided no
speech protections—there was one specific type of speech which was
protected, and that was the speech of legislators. The English Bill of
Rights of 1689, an obviously foundational document, explicitly
extended protection to speech and debate within Parliament,
providing “[t]hat the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court
or place out of Parliament.” 65 Following this model, colonial charters
similarly protected the speech rights of their members (during
sessions of the legislature), and such rights were generally
respected. 66 Finally, the original (unamended) United States
Constitution of course provides that members of Congress “shall not
be questioned in any other [p]lace” for “any Speech or Debate in
either House.” 67 Obviously, these provisions were not intended to
prevent only prior restraints—by their very language they protect
primarily against subsequent punishment. As such, they provide a

61. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47.
62. Rabban, supra note 50, at 832.
63. LEVY, supra note 9, at 3, 5.
64. See supra text accompanying note 44.
65. English Bill of Rights (1689), http://www.constitution.org/eng/eng_bor.htm; see
also LEVY, supra note 9, at 14.
66. David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429,
431–34 (1983).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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clear precedent for protecting speech against more than
prior restraints.
Moreover, there can be little doubt that the Speech and Debate
Clause and its forebears, notably in the English Bill of Rights, had an
important influence on the First Amendment, and more generally on
understandings of what the phrase “freedom of speech” meant. It
cannot be a coincidence that the phrase “freedom of speech” in the
First Amendment exactly matches the words of the English Bill of
Rights, and as David Bogen notes, prior to the American Revolution
the phrase “freedom of speech” in colonial charters inevitably
referred to the rights of legislators, which surely must have
influenced assumptions about what the right meant when extended
to all citizens. 68 Similarly, Philip Kurland recognizes that the term
“freedom of speech” in pre-Revolutionary America was used to refer
to immunity from subsequent punishment on the part of
legislators. 69 Finally, Akhil Amar has elaborated more extensively on
the connections between legislative “freedom of speech” and the
First Amendment. He points out that the Parliamentary privilege of
freedom of speech was closely tied to the English Whig theory that
sovereignty rested in Parliament. 70 When the American
Revolutionaries adopted a theory of popular sovereignty, it followed
logically that the parliamentary privilege should be extended to
sovereign citizens 71—and to reiterate, that privilege was not freedom
from prior restraints; it was a bar on subsequent prosecution.
In light of the overwhelming evidence set forth above that the
phrase “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment was not limited
to a bar on prior restraints, from where does this misunderstanding
originate? The answer must lie in the seemingly parallel treatment of
speech and the press in the language of the First Amendment
(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press”). 72 Presumably, the reasoning is that given this
formulation, surely the rights must be coextensive. That quick
assumption, however, is suspect for three distinct reasons. The first is
that this verbal parallelism was not always a part of the proposed

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Bogen, supra note 43, at 431.
Kurland, supra note 9, at 255.
AMAR, supra note 6, at 223.
Id. at 24–25; see also Kurland, supra note 9, at 255.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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amendment. James Madison’s original proposal to Congress did not
describe the right to speech and the “freedom of the press” in
identical or even parallel language. It read, in its entirety, as follows:
“The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall
be inviolable.” 73
This language, which is essentially identical to the language in
George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, 74 quite clearly
treats “freedom of the press” as a concept quite distinct from the
separate protections for the “right to speak, to write, or to publish.”
During the drafting process this language was shortened to its
current form and combined with the Assembly and Petition Clauses
(as well as, much later, with the Religion Clauses). 75 But there is
absolutely no indication that these changes were intended to change
the substantive content of the amendment, or to create an identity
between the speech and press rights.
Second, focusing on the connection between speech and the
press ignores the broader context of the First Amendment, an
unfortunately common occurrence. 76 The Free Speech Clause is
paired in the First Amendment not only with the Press Clause, but
also with the Assembly and Petition Clauses. 77 Speech, press,
assembly, and petition are all (in the words of the Supreme Court)
“cognate” rights that protect parallel, interconnected political
functions essential to democratic self-governance. 78 Yet no one

73. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83.
74. Mason’s language read, “That the People have a right to Freedom of speech, and of
writing and publishing their Sentiments; that the Freedom of the Press is one of the great
Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.” See Mason’s Master Draft, supra note 48,
at ¶ 16.
75. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 84–92.
76. See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY 61–62 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has not invoked the Assembly
Clause of the First Amendment in over thirty years, essentially merging the freedom of
assembly into speech).
77. It also appears in the company of the Religion Clauses, but as noted earlier, that
juxtaposition, unlike the combining of the political rights of speech, the press, assembly, and
petition, appears to have been a product of historic accident. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
78. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945). For a broader discussion of the connections between the political rights in
the First Amendment, see Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 984–85.
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would argue that the assembly and petition rights mean no more
than freedom from prior restraints. The petition right is based
directly on the petition right granted in the English Bill of Rights
(though its roots are much older 79), the language of which explicitly
protects against subsequent prosecution. 80 And as Tabatha Abu ElHaj has extensively demonstrated, assemblies were understood
through the first century of the American Republic to be protected
from both permitting requirements and subsequent prosecution,
unless they were disruptive or violent. 81 Thus, of the four interlinked
political rights protected by the First Amendment, only the press
right was associated with freedom from prior restraints, an
association that arose because of the historical prominence of the
battle over press licensing from its imposition in the sixteenth
century to its abandonment by Parliament in 1694–95, following the
Glorious Revolution. 82
The third and final reason why simple parallelism between the
Speech and Press Clauses is unwarranted is more fundamental: when
drafted, the two clauses protected fundamentally different human
activities. As noted earlier, 83 during the Framing era there was a
fundamental difference between what the speech clause protected—
unamplified, in-person oral communication—and what the press
clause protected—printed products created using the printing press.
These were distinct forms of communication, indeed two of the only
three forms of communication (along with hand-written notes and
letters) available given eighteenth-century technology, and they had
very different social significance. Oral speech, by its nature, could
reach only small audiences, especially given the lack of amplification.
The power of speech to organize and persuade, and thus the risks
speech posed to society, were inherently limited. On the other hand,
the press was a form, indeed the only form, of mass communication
capable of reaching thousands. Books and pamphlets could shape

79. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1299–1300 (2008).
80. English Bill of Rights, supra note 65 (“That it is the right of the subjects to petition
the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”).
81. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics and
Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949, 992–93 (2014); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the
People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 42–45 (2011).
82. See Meyerson, supra note 38, at 298–305.
83. See supra Part II, para. 2.
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opinion and engender mass action in ways that no other form of
communication could even come close to doing. That, of course, is
why England imposed licensing on the press prior to the Glorious
Revolution, and it is also why the Framing generation focused on
freedom of the press and largely ignored freedom of speech. Speech
just was not that important, and had not historically been subject to
anything like the social controls, censorship, and suppression as had
products of the printing press.
Indeed, even Blackstone appears to concede this point. In the
passage in which Blackstone defines freedom of the press as a lack of
previous restraints, he clarifies that this means the law is permitted to
“punish . . . any dangerous or offensive writings.” 84 He then goes on
to defend this rule: “Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon
freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still
left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments,
destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society
corrects.” 85 At least one natural reading of this passage is that what
the law condemns is the public distribution of “bad sentiments”
through the press; but freedom of conscience and private speech
remain in place. The reason, of course, is that mass dissemination of
dangerous ideas threatens “the preservation of peace and good
order,” 86 whereas private activities do not.
The difficulties with translating historical understandings into
contemporary law arise from the fact that the sharp historical
distinctions between speech and the press have blurred in modern
times. Doctrinally, as noted earlier, the Press Clause has been largely
subsumed into the Speech Clause in the past century (almost a
reversal of the Framing era). 87 But doctrine and the Court are not
the cause of the confusion; they merely reflect a more basic driving
force, which is changing technology. While drawing a clear
distinction between speech and the press was easy in 1791, it
obviously no longer is today. Even by the end of the nineteenth
century, with the invention of the telegraph and telephone,
distinctions were blurring as speech gradually ceased to be limited to
in-person communication. But more modern inventions, such as

84.
85.
86.
87.
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broadcasting, cable television, and now the Internet, have utterly
broken down any clear lines. Are television and radio broadcasts
more analogous to speech, or to the press? Both are forms of mass
communication, after all, but much of the communication is oral (all
of the communication in the case of radio). And what of a website?
Does it matter if a website consists of written words or video clips?
Should it? And what about a tweet, or a Facebook post?
These questions seem absurd because they are—today, all forms
of communications are merging with each other, and they tend to
share common traits with both historical speech and the historical
press. In particular, much communication has potentially mass
audiences, paralleling the historical press, but its ubiquity (and so its
inability to be controlled ex ante) makes it more like speech. The
modern judicial solution has been to abandon the speech/press
distinction and call everything “speech.” This collapsing is perhaps
inevitable given technological developments, and it is probably wise
as a matter of social policy. It, however, has absolutely no historical
basis. Whatever our current practice, neither the Framers nor the
generation that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment (who had the
telegraph, but no other modern communications technology) 88
equated speech and the press.
III. WHAT OF THE PRESS?
For all of the above reasons, it seems reasonably clear that the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was not understood to
be limited to freedom from “censorship” or “previous restraints.”
But what about the press? Is it true that the original intent of the
First Amendment’s Press Clause was to adopt the limited,
Blackstonian definition? These questions matter because, for the
reasons noted at the end of Part II, there is at least an argument to
be made that much of modern communication, because of its
potential to reach mass audiences, is more analogous to the Framers’
understanding of the press than their understanding of speech. If so,
then a purported strict originalist 89 would presumably feel obliged to
88. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. This timing matters, of course,
because the “freedom of speech and of the press” applies to the states because it has been
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
89. This strict originalist presumably shares an apartment with those other elusive
characters, the reasonable person and the rational economic actor.
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protect such communications only from licensing or other
prior restraints.
In fact, however, even with respect to the press, Judge Posner’s
assertion that freedom from prior restraints “is the original
understanding” 90 of the First Amendment moves too fast. First,
consider his sources. Recall that Posner cites in support of his
assertion an opinion by Justice Holmes, one of his own earlier
opinions, Akhil Amar, and Blackstone. 91 Leaving aside the citation to
his previous opinion, which did not truly address the question of
whether freedom of the press meant only no prior restraints, let us
consider each of these sources.
Posner’s first citation is to Justice Holmes’s opinion in Patterson
v. Colorado. 92 There are, however, two clear problems with this use of
Holmes. First, Holmes does not say in Patterson that freedom from
previous restraints is the only purpose of the First Amendment, but
that freedom from previous restraints was “the main purpose.” 93 It
should be added that even in Patterson, the first Justice Harlan wrote
a powerful dissent explicitly rejecting the Blackstonian position. 94
Second, and more fundamentally, Holmes of course famously
recanted this view, first explicitly in the Schenck decision announcing
the clear and present danger test, 95 and then more definitively, albeit
implicitly, in his separate opinions that became the foundation of
modern free speech law. 96 Thus, Holmes is a weak source for such a
strong assertion.
Posner also relies on Akhil Amar, and in particular on his book
The Bill of Rights. 97 Amar, however, is also a problematic source.
Although Amar does discuss the importance of juries as a shield
against unjust prosecutions of the press and notes that prior

90. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610–11 (Posner, J., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
92. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 461–62 (1907)).
93. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462.
94. Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“It well may be that the
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson.”).
96. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing AMAR, supra note 6, at 23–
24).
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restraints were troublesome because they removed jury protections,
later in his book Amar explicitly rejects the narrow Blackstonian
reading of the Press Clause. 98 He does this in part based on theories
of popular sovereignty, but also because he considers the Speech and
Press Clauses to be “in pari materia.” 99 Amar argues that since
limiting the Speech Clause to “freedom from prior restraint is utterly
outlandish,” it must also be true that the Press Clause is not
so limited. 100
That leaves Blackstone as the ultimate and only independent
source of the narrow reading of the Press Clause. Blackstone did say
that freedom of the press meant only freedom from previous
restraints. However, Blackstone, writing in 1769, was not referring
to the meaning of the First Amendment, drafted twenty years later,
but was talking about the English common law. To assume that
Blackstone’s meaning was adopted wholly by the Framers of the First
Amendment is a major leap, and as we shall see, a contested one.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Blackstone had some
influence on the thinking of the Framers. Consequently, he cannot
be discounted entirely.
Even if Posner’s sources do not fully support his assertion this
does not mean he is wrong. Furthermore, Amar’s argument that the
Speech and Press Clauses are in pari materia (which is essentially
identical to an argument made two centuries earlier by Albert
Gallatin against the Blackstonian reading of the Press Clause 101) is
not altogether satisfying. For all of the reasons stated above,
whatever the linguistic parallelism in the text of the First
Amendment, speech and the press were very different means of
communication in the eighteenth century with very different
histories. So, while it is possible that freedom of the press meant the
same thing to the Framers as freedom of speech, one cannot
so assume.
What is needed, then, is a close examination of the history of
press regulation and freedom before and during the Framing era.
Leonard Levy has engaged in precisely such a close examination in

98.
99.
100.
101.

See AMAR, supra note 6, at 23–24, 223–24.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223–24.
See LEVY, supra note 9, at 303–04.
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Emergence of a Free Press 102 (which is a revised and expanded version
of his groundbreaking book Legacy of Suppression 103). When one
reads Levy’s recitation of history, the overwhelming impression is
one of confusion and uncertainty. There were undoubtedly some
members of the Framing generation, notably James Wilson during
the ratification debates and many Federalists during the debates over
the Sedition Act, who whole-heartedly defended the narrow,
Blackstonian reading of the Press Clause. 104 However, there is a rich
intellectual history predating the First Amendment suggesting that a
broader, albeit somewhat inchoate, understanding of freedom of the
press had evolved by 1789. Moreover, there is no dispute that
during the Sedition Act debates (i.e., by the end of the eighteenth
century), a very large number of prominent thinkers, all associated
with Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party, were articulating a
clear, intellectually coherent, and broad vision of press freedoms that
went well beyond freedom from prior restraints. 105 A brief
examination of the history of press freedoms in the colonies and after
independence demonstrates why a simple assertion that the
Blackstonian view of the Press Clause constituted “the original
understanding” 106 is so problematic.
Let us start by discussing the law of seditious libel, because that
is Levy’s focus, and it created the key confrontation between narrow
and broad readings of the Press Clause in 1798. The crime of
seditious libel was, of course, brought to the colonies from England,
along with the principle that truth was no defense to such a charge
and various procedural rules designed to favor the prosecution
(notably the rule that the judge, not the jury, was to determine if the
charged words were seditious). 107 Seditious libel prosecutions,
however, were almost unknown in colonial America, and they ended
completely after the famously unsuccessful prosecution of Peter

102. See LEVY, supra note 9.
103. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1964).
104. See Kurland, supra note 9, at 235–36 (describing Wilson’s speech at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention); LEVY, supra note 9, at 204–05 (doing the same); id. at 301
& n.75 (discussing speeches by Federalists during the Sedition Act debates).
105. Id. at 301–04.
106. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
107. LEVY, supra note 9, at 7–12.
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Zenger in 1735. 108 It is noteworthy that during Zenger’s
prosecution, his attorney, Andrew Hamilton, explicitly argued that
freedom of the press required proof of falsity for a charge of
seditious libel, and that the question of libel must be sent to the
jury—that is, he urged the jury to reject the traditional English rule
as tyrannical. 109 And whatever the legal merits of Hamilton’s
argument, he did convince the jury, which refused to convict. 110 Levy
concedes that the Zenger prosecution became a symbol in colonial
America of the unjustness of the law of seditious libel and of the
importance of a free press, 111 indicating that as early as 1735 a
broader understanding of freedom of the press was emerging in
American thought and popular consciousness, even if legal
precedents had not been altered. 112
Moreover, this broader understanding did not emerge out of the
ether, nor did its evolution end with the Zenger case. In the two
decades prior to the Zenger case, two English journalists writing
under the name “Cato” had set forth a well-developed theory of
freedom of speech and of the press, which recognized the essential
role of such freedom in checking the abuse of official authority, and
which specifically criticized aspects of the law of seditious libel,
notably that truth was not a defense. 113 These arguments, published
in book form under the title “Cato’s Letters,” were extensively
distributed and quoted in the colonies, and were explicitly referred
to by many leading members of the Framing generation, including
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin. 114 That John
Adams was aware of and approved of Cato’s arguments is particularly
significant because of a later episode. In 1789, Chief Justice William
Cushing of Massachusetts initiated a correspondence with John
Adams regarding the meaning of the free press clause of the
Massachusetts Constitution, which Adams had drafted. In his letter,
Cushing raised and explicitly repudiated Blackstone’s understanding
limiting freedom of the press to an absence of prior restraints, and he
cited Cato in support of his view in particular that the clause
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 41–43.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 37–38.
See Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 17.
LEVY, supra note 9, at 109–13.
Id. at 113–14.
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required that truth may not be prosecuted as seditious libel. 115
Adams agreed in his reply, arguing that whatever the law in England,
the democratic Constitution of Massachusetts required that citizens
be able to truthfully criticize government officials. 116
Nor was Adams alone or unusual in his views, as illustrated by a
sequence of incidents twenty years earlier in Massachusetts involving
another (colonial era) Chief Justice and another Adams. In 1768,
then Governor Francis Bernard sought the support of the lower
house of the Massachusetts legislature in initiating a seditious libel
prosecution based on a newspaper story which vilified the governor.
The house refused, adopting (for the first time) a resolution in favor
of the “Liberty of the Press.” 117 Chief Justice Hutchinson of
Massachusetts sought to nonetheless obtain an indictment, citing in
support the narrow Blackstonian definition of liberty of the press.
The grand jury also refused to give its support. And in response to
these events, the leading patriot (and John Adams’s cousin) Samuel
Adams published a series of articles extolling the freedom of the
press as the essential “bulwark of the People’s Liberties.” 118 Adams’s
language is particularly interesting because it is so closely echoed in
the eventual language, twenty years later, of both George Mason’s
Master Bill of Rights that provided the key model for the Bill of
Rights, 119 and (reflecting Mason) James Madison’s original proposal
to Congress, which eventually lead to the Bill of Rights. 120 It is
essential to note that Adams’s arguments were triggered not by a
proposal to impose prior restraints, but by a subsequent prosecution
of speech.
It should be no surprise that this broader reading of press
freedoms was not limited to either the Adams cousins or to
Massachusetts. Indeed, such opinions can be found much earlier
than the two episodes just recounted. To give just two examples

115. Id. at 199–200.
116. Id. at 200. There is, of course, some irony in this given the Adams Administration’s
later support for and enforcement of the Sedition Act; but, as we shall see, this irony does have
an explanation.
117. Id. at 66.
118. Id. at 67 (quoting Adams, BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 14, 1768).
119. See Mason’s Master Draft, supra note 48, at ¶ 16 (“[T]he Freedom of the Press is
one of the great Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.”).
120. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83 (“[T]he freedom of the
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”).
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among many, in 1722, a young printer named Benjamin Franklin
reprinted one of Cato’s essays in defense of his brother James who
had been imprisoned by the legislature (so again, not in response to
a prior restraint). 121 Nine years later, in 1731, Ben Franklin published
a more extensive defense of press freedoms, this time in his own
voice. 122 At about the same time, James Alexander, a well-known
lawyer and friend of Peter Zenger, published articles strongly
defending press freedoms as essential in a limited, as opposed to an
absolute, monarchy, and explicitly extended his definition to include
some immunity from subsequent prosecution. 123
There is thus little doubt that a substantial school of thought had
developed in the American colonies, brought to the forefront by the
1735 Zenger prosecution and continuing to develop afterwards, that
defined the freedom of the press to mean more than freedom from
prior restraints. 124 What exactly that meant was no doubt
underdeveloped and somewhat inchoate in the minds of most.
However, at a minimum, as Levy concedes, it appears to have
encompassed permitting truth as a defense, permitting general jury
verdicts, and requiring proof of malicious intent in seditious libel
prosecutions. 125 Indeed, in 1804 none other than Alexander
Hamilton argued that freedom of the press required truth as a
defense in a seditious libel prosecution. 126 This is no doubt why in his
1985 book, Emergence of a Free Press, Levy explicitly repudiated the
notion hinted at in his 1960 book, Legacy of Suppression, that the
original intent of the Press Clause of the First Amendment was to
prevent prior restraints and nothing more. 127
The reason for Levy’s original mistake was simple—it was not
truly the question he was addressing. The question that Levy was
focused on, both in 1960 and in 1985, was whether the First
Amendment eliminated entirely the crime of seditious libel. And on
121. LEVY, supra note 9, at 119.
122. Id. at 119–120. Franklin, unsurprisingly, continued to defend freedom of the press
into his later years. See CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 17.
123. LEVY, supra note 9, at 124–27.
124. For further support of for this position, see CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 17–18.
125. LEVY, supra note 9, at 169–70.
126. CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 28 & n.60.
127. LEVY, supra note 9, at xi. Levy’s recantation probably explains why Judge Posner
did not cite Levy in his ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez opinion, despite the fact that Levy is the
leading modern voice for a narrow reading of the original intent of the First Amendment’s
speech and press clauses.
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that question, he held to his belief that it had not, albeit it may have
required the modifications described previously regarding truth as a
defense, general jury verdicts, and proof of malice. 128 In so arguing,
Levy notes, he is rejecting the contrary statements of such luminaries
as Justice Holmes, 129 Justice Black, 130 Justice Brennan speaking for a
unanimous Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 131 and Professor
Zechariah Chafee. 132 As to whether Levy is right in this regard, it is
very difficult to say. He may well be correct that, at least until the
controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, opinions had not fully
formed on the subject, and as such there was no clearly crystalized
“intent” on that issue. This is not to say, however, that if someone
had asked leading Framers such as James Madison in 1791 whether
seditious libel prosecutions were consistent with the First
Amendment that they would have agreed that they were—there is
simply no way to know the answer to the latter question. But the
notion that a large part of the Framing generation understood the
First Amendment at least to limit, if not to eliminate, seditious libel
is supported by the fact that the Sedition Act of 1798, drafted, after
all, by arch Federalists, incorporated the restrictions described
previously, including truth as a defense, general jury verdicts, and a
requirement of proof of malice. 133
Much of the support for the narrow Blackstonian reading of the
Press Clause appears to be built on the premise that the only
alternative is to permit no subsequent punishment of speech, even if
libelous or otherwise dangerous. But this is a straw man at best. It is
true that even prior to the adoption of the First Amendment some
thinkers, including notably Montesquieu, had raised the possibility
that only overt acts, not speech, should be subject to punishment; 134
and more recently there were times when Justice Black seemed to

128. Id. at xiii.
129. Id. at xiii & n.5 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
130. Id. at xiii & n.6 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1951) (Black,
J., dissenting)).
131. Id. at xiii & n.7 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
132. Id. at xiii–xiv & n.10 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 21).
133. Id. at xi; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH DURING WARTIME
43–44 (2004).
134. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 151–53, 163–68.
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hint at such a broad reading. 135 But that has never been the
mainstream view, either in the judiciary or among commentators.
Indeed, when the Supreme Court addressed the issue of libel against
public officials—the modern cousin of seditious libel—in New York
Times v. Sullivan, it did not entirely forbid such lawsuits; instead, it
merely required proof of falsehood and “actual malice,” meaning
that the speaker knew the statement was false or recklessly
disregarded the truth. 136 The real question, as Levy recognizes, is not
whether the First Amendment permitted any punishment for
publication or speech—of course it did—but where the line was to
be drawn between protected speech on the one hand, and “abuse”
or “licentious” speech on the other. 137 And on that question, there
was probably little thought given before the controversy of 1798,
which exposed deep divides.
This takes us to the Sedition Act of 1798, undoubtedly the
formative moment in early American thinking about freedom of
speech and the press. Geoffrey Stone accurately describes the
Sedition Act as “[t]he centerpiece of the Federalists’ legislative
program of 1798,” adopted in response to concerns about
impending war with France and Jacobinism within the rival
Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson. 138 Moreover,
Federalist supporters of the Act defended it by adopting Blackstone’s
narrow understanding of press freedoms. 139
As noted previously, however, the Sedition Act did not simply
replicate the English common law; rather, it incorporated the liberal
restrictions advocated for during and after the Zenger prosecution. 140
By this time, however, it had become clear to the Republicans that
these “reforms” were going to prove wholly illusory because
prosecutions were generally directed at political opinions, whose
truth it was impossible to prove (the burden lay on the defendant),
and because Federalist juries were anxious to convict their political
opponents. 141 And indeed, the protections were entirely ineffective,
135. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157–59 (1959); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 293, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
136. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
137. LEVY, supra note 9, at 273–74, 303–04.
138. STONE, supra note 133, at 36, 43, 67.
139. LEVY, supra note 9, at 301–02; STONE, supra note 133, at 40–41.
140. STONE, supra note 133, at 43–44.
141. Id. at 44.
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placing no obstacles to the Federalists’ use of the Act to harass and
suppress their political opponents. 142
The passage of the Sedition Act, its biased enforcement, and the
failure of the limitations written into the Act to prevent its abuse
forced the intellectual leaders of the Republican Party, for the first
time, to confront key questions regarding the role of free speech and
freedom of the press in a republic based on popular sovereignty, as
well as whether seditious libel prosecutions were consistent with that
role. What emerged was a sophisticated theory linking freedom of
the press to democracy and rejecting seditious libel as inconsistent
with the concept of popular sovereignty. 143 In the congressional
debates over the Sedition Act, Republican congressmen John
Nicholas and Albert Gallatin rejected the argument that providing
truth as a defense was sufficient to protect political opinion and, in
the course of doing so, rejected the Blackstonian reading of either
the Speech or Press Clauses. 144 In a debate over repealing the
Sedition Act in 1799, Nicholas took the argument one step further.
He argued that the entire law of seditious libel was based on the
British system of hereditary monarchy and simply had no place in the
United States, where the people were sovereign and government
officers were their servants. 145 A number of other Republican
politicians and authors followed suit, expounding the developing
theory that popular sovereignty required strong protections for the
press and that prosecutions for seditious libel violated
those protections. 146
The most famous Republican attack on the Sedition Act was
undoubtedly Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, issued by
the Virginia House of Delegates in 1800. 147 In it, Madison fully
explicates the Republican reading of the First Amendment,
explaining that the common law of seditious libel was based on the
British system of government, in which only the King was seen as a
threat to liberty.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 44, 46–48, 67–68.
Id. at 43.
LEVY, supra note 9, at 301–04.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 311–15.
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 293 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (Jan. 1800), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html.
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In the United States the case is altogether different. The People,
not the Government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The
Legislature, no less than the Executive, is under limitations of
power. . . . This security of the freedom of the press requires that it
be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in
Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this
exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption not only from
the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent
penalty of laws. 148

He then went on to argue that press freedoms were intrinsically tied
to “governments elective, limited, and responsible, in all their
branches” because of the need for the press to “canvass[] the merits
and measures of public men.” 149 In short, by 1800 Madison had
developed and expounded a fully formed theory of free expression,
tied to democratic government and popular sovereignty, which
repudiated not only Blackstone but also the view that the crime of
seditious libel only needed reform, not abandonment.
One final Republican thinker that is worthy of particular
attention is St. George Tucker. Tucker was Professor of Law at the
College of William and Mary in Virginia, and in 1803 he published
an extremely influential American version of Blackstone along with
an appendix in which he considered how the Constitution and Bill of
Rights altered the English common law. 150 In it, Tucker built on
Madison’s Report, arguing that Blackstone’s reading of freedom of
the press was only the English understanding, and that in America,
because of the principle of popular sovereignty, the press and the
people must enjoy an absolute right to inquire about and criticize
their agents. 151 Regarding individual libel or slander, Tucker’s view
was that, again, Congress lacked all authority, but recourse to state
courts remained open. 152

148.
149.
150.

Id.; see also STONE, supra note 133, at 45; LEVY, supra note 9, at 316–17.
Report on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 147.
St. George Tucker, Appendix to Volume First, Part Second, in BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
151. Id. at 15, 17–20, 24, 28–29; St. George Tucker, Appendix to Volume First, Part
First, in BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 297–98 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
152. Id. at 298–99.
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It is thus obvious that by the end of the eighteenth century, one
of the dominant political movements in the United States, which as
of the election of 1800 was to take control of the entire elected
federal government, had developed a capacious understanding of
freedom of the press, rooted in strong views about democratic
politics and popular sovereignty, which went far beyond the narrow
vision of Blackstone, and even beyond the reforms proposed in the
wake of the Zenger prosecution. The response of defenders of the
Blackstonian position appears to be that this reading of the First
Amendment was made up out of whole cloth in response to the
Sedition Act and has no relevance to the understandings of 1789–
1791. 153 This may, of course, be true, but there are reasons to be
skeptical. First of all, it should be noted that the criticism of
Republican theories of free speech in 1798 as partisan and
opportunistic are equally applicable to the Federalists who defended
the Sedition Act on Blackstonian grounds. Moreover, it is
particularly dubious to accept the Federalists’ interpretation of the
First Amendment as gospel in light of their original opposition to
the entire Bill of Rights. In truth, given the viciously partisan
atmosphere of 1798–1800, it is hard to imagine anyone on either
side adopting positions based on thoughtful contemplation, as
opposed to hopes of partisan advantage.
It is also not true that there were simply no precedents for the
broad, Republican theory of free speech before 1798. As early as
1794 Madison, in congressional debates over the DemocraticRepublican societies, articulated a broad vision of free speech and
freedom of the press, rooted in popular sovereignty, that provides a
clear antecedent to his Report of 1800. 154 Furthermore, while St.
George Tucker’s version of Blackstone was not published until 1803,
it was based on lecture notes that he began developing in 1790.
Obviously, the references to the Sedition Act had to have been
written after 1798, but there is no way to know if he had begun
developing his theories at an earlier date. Most fundamentally, as
David Rabban has pointed out, English Whig Radicals had
developed theories of free expression based on popular sovereignty

153.
154.
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long before the American Revolution, 155 and while these radicals had
little influence in England, highly respected modern scholarship that
Rabban cites demonstrates their profound influence on American
Revolutionary thought. 156 Certainly it is true that in the early 1790s,
long before the Sedition Act, the Democratic-Republican societies
had linked free speech with popular sovereignty, laying the
groundwork for the later Republican position. 157 At an intellectual
level, Rabban points out that Blackstone’s conservatism was rooted
in his rejection of the Radical Whig theory of popular sovereignty in
favor of parliamentary sovereignty. 158 Given that the Framers
unequivocally rejected Blackstone’s theory of sovereignty (even
James Wilson condemned Blackstone), 159 it seems highly implausible
that the Framers, creators of a Constitution whose first words were
“We the People,” intended to accept his narrow view of freedom of
the press that was premised on that theory. 160
None of this is to say that there was in 1791, when the Bill of
Rights was ratified, a well-accepted understanding that the Press
Clause eliminated the law of seditious libel—among the wealth of
issues faced by the nation’s leaders in the early Republic, this was
surely not one to which they would have given much thought.
Indeed, it cannot be definitively proven that the Framers accepted
that the First Amendment required reform of seditious libel, though
the evidence here is more compelling. Benjamin Franklin probably
came closest to stating the truth of the matter when he said in 1789
regarding the First Amendment that “few of us” had any “distinct
Ideas of its Nature and Extent.” 161 Hamilton said much the same
thing in the Federalist Papers. 162 Levy probably says it best when he

155. Rabban, supra note 50, at 823–24 (giving a brief synopsis of existing scholarship on
the influence of English Whig Radicals in America).
156. Id. at 801, 821–22, 827–28 (citing, e.g., Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and
Early American Historiography, 39 WM & MARY Q. 334 (1982); BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967)).
157. Rabban, supra note 50, at 845–46; see also id. at 821.
158. Id. at 826–27.
159. See STONE, supra note 133, at 42–43; Rabban, supra note 50, at 828–29.
160. See Rabban, supra note 50, at 829–30.
161. STONE, supra note 133, at 42 (quoting Benjamin Franklin, An Account of the
Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania, viz. The Court of the Press (Sept. 12, 1789), in
10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 37 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907)).
162. See Meyerson, supra note 38, at 320 & n.176 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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comments: “Whether the Framers themselves knew what they had in
mind is uncertain. At the time of the drafting and ratification of the
First Amendment, few among them clearly understood what they
meant by the free speech-and-press clause, and we cannot know that
those few represented a consensus.” 163 What is clear—indeed the
only thing that is clear—is that any firm statements about the
original intent of the First Amendment should be met with extreme
skepticism given the paucity and contradictory nature of the
historical evidence.
CONCLUSION
The question this essay sought to answer was whether Judge
Posner was correct in flatly asserting that “the original
understanding” of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
was to bar censorship—i.e., previous or prior restraints—and nothing
else. A perusal of the historical record, as well as the scholarship,
fairly clearly indicates that while there are no clear answers to exactly
what the First Amendment meant to the Framers, some conclusions
are possible. It is probably true that the Free Speech Clause was not
limited to barring prior restraints because that would denude the
clause of all meaning, but given the Framers’ lack of attention to
speech, no smoking-gun evidence can be found either way. As for
the Press Clause, again the better reading is probably that it was not
so limited, but here even greater uncertainty reigns, especially
because there were undoubtedly differences of opinion among the
Framers. Given this paucity of certain answers, can any lessons be
drawn here? I think that two themes do emerge.
The first concerns the difficulties of “translation”—to use Larry
Lessig’s metaphor 164—of constitutional meaning from the Framing
era to the present, given the massive technological and societal
changes that separate us. Today, we generally describe all forms of
expression as “speech,” and as such treat the Press Clause as largely
subsumed by the Speech Clause. Given modern communications
technology, that conflation makes sense; indeed, it seems
unavoidable. In the Framing era, however, speech and the press were
very different things, with different social and political roles.
Furthermore, for the Framers it was the press that most mattered
163.
164.
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and was the center of controversy; free speech barely entered their
consciousness. The result is that looking back, we fail to see that
freedom of speech and freedom of the press did not mean the same
thing in 1791, and we thus cannot assume that something said about
the press applies to speech, or vice-versa. More generally, it is
necessary to be extremely cautious about how we understand casual
statements from a very different era without giving careful thought
to the social and technological context they reflect.
The second theme concerns the occasionally problematic nature
of the entire originalist enterprise. There is no doubt that there are
good, principled arguments in favor of interpreting the Constitution
based on its original meaning. The difficulty, as this short essay has
demonstrated, is that there is often no there there. 165 With many
important constitutional provisions, including notably the Speech
and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, the Framers adopted
broad language stating abstract principles where there was broad
consensus, but they thought little of the details of what those
principles meant in practice. As Levy puts it, “the Constitution was
purposely made to embody first ideas and sketchy notions.” 166 To
make matters worse, when they were finally forced to consider
specific questions, as happened during the Sedition Act controversy,
the Framers turned out to have sharply different views regarding the
proper answers, and even regarding basic political theory. 167 What, in
that situation, is an originalist to do? Perhaps it is to concede that
while original meaning is sometimes a useful guide, often it simply
is not.

165. Cf. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
166. LEVY, supra note 9, at 348.
167. See STONE, supra note 133, at 43 (discussing the very different political theories of
the Federalists and Republicans).
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